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TRUTH and FAITH
ANTHONY P. KEARNS*
GEORGE W. GOBLE, ESQ. in his article "The Dilemma of the Natural
Law"' continues in brilliant fashion and with acute mind this sub-
ject on which he initially wrote so well in the American Bar Association
Journal. 2
In discussing Mr. Goble's latest treatise, I would like to consider his
story of Xenophon and Zeno. 3 In this tale, as so recounted, Messieurs
Xenophon and Zeno were not Greeks, but prehistoric cave dwellers, who
lived in a constant state of strife and combat. After a terrific struggle,
Xenophon knocked Zeno down, jumped upon him and picked up a
boulder with which to bash his head in. But Xenophon just did not kill
Zeno, because a thought flashed through the victorious brain that he was
superior and it was not necessary to kill the prostrate Zeno. Before that,
cave dwellers always crushed the skull of a defeated adversary, but now
out of nowhere an added quality of the milk of human kindness swells
into the savage breast of Xenophon. How Mr. Xenophon became so
mercifully inclined we are left with the possibility, "Perhaps it was
caused by chance." Zeno is grateful for continuation of his humble lot
and brings gifts to his conqueror and Xenophon thereupon decides it's
good to spare a life because the living conquered one "will bring me food."
And so, we are told, "A moral law had evolved." Compared to this
tale, the biblical account of the creation of man in Genesis and of Cain
and Abel is like an on the spot live television program. Undoubtedly,
the moral law implied to have evolved in the tale of Xenophon and
Zeno is that one human being should not murder another. Before that,
murder was the proper order of the day and of the night as well. This
prehistoric saga rather indicates that, instead of the birth of morality,
there was an evolution by which dictators and tyrants, in the person of
the bullying Xenophon, and slaves and sycophants, in the person of the
obsequious Zeno, came to plague us.
''A.B., M.A., Seton Hall (1921); LL.B., Fordham Law School; Knight of St.
Gregory; formerly Judge of Recorder's Court, Bernards Township, N. J. and of
Somerset County (N. J.) District Court.
1 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226 (July 1956).
2 Goble, Nature, M~lan and Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955).
3 Goble, supra note 2, at 407.
TRUTH AND FAITH
For an analysis of this story of Xeno-
phon and Zeno on a rational basis, I
state two propositions, namely: out of
nothing, nothing is made; and no effect is
greater than its cause. To say that Xeno-
phon caused his own sense of morality or
that it happened by chance is contradictory
of these propositions. To act, the cause
must possess the potentiality to accom-
plish the result. Hence, Xenophon must
have possessed a faculty capable of judging
that not to murder is good and this faculty
had to be possessed with such capacity
before the fact and not after. To hold
otherwise is to make the effect the pro-
duction of the cause. To hold that the
cave man himself produced his sense of
morality or that it happened by chance is
to become a disciple of subjectivism or to
be immersed into pantheism.
Xenophon and Zeno had the use of
reason, for we are informed in Mr. Goble's
story of their thoughts. The simplest act
of the intellect is an idea; thus tree, color,
desk, size, beauty, morality, bravery, evil,
and so on, ad infinitum, all abstractions.
Then we have judgment, when we predi-
cate one idea about another, as the tree is
an elm or to spare life is good. Lastly from
two judgments, we can conclude a third,
for example, a man has a soul, George
Goble is a man, therefore George Goble
has a soul or just plain old, a equals b, b
equals c, therefore a equals c. This we call
reasoning and we have nothing more. But,
no other being but man has this power to
reason. On this process of reasoning are
all our accumulated stores of knowledge
built and our sciences developed. When
we express a judgment, be it an original
one or one inferred by reason, whether
spoken or written or by sign language, we
state a proposition. Now, here, into our
discussion must come the question of
truth. A thing cannot be true and false at
the same time. There is no border line of
truth. Truth is marked by a precise line of
demarcation. Let us see: I have a pen in
my hand. From its shape, color and other
characteristics, I form the judgment "This
object is a pen." Objectively the pen exists
and I have objective knowledge of it. Then,
if I state the proposition, telling you "This
object is a pen," my statement is true, but
if I tell you that what I have in my hand
is an oyster, I have stated a falsity, for my
proposition does not conform to my judg-
ment. If, however, I have in my hand a
small atomic bomb cleverly disguised with
all the appearances of and indistinguish-
able from a pen, and I know it is such a
terrible weapon, and again I tell you it is a
pen, I again lie; but, if I do not know it is
a bomb and think this object is a pen, then
subjectively I do not lie for my proposition
agrees with my judgment, but objectively
neither my judgment nor my proposition
agree with the object itself and are false.
I, as a man, am responsible for my utter-
ances and my acts. The law itself places
such responsibility on men, regulating their
conduct. Aside from per se legislation (in
which intent is presumed), the defendant
is charged with wilful violation of the law.
The law takes into account the necessity of
the prisoner having a fixed purpose to
commit the crime. Thus, for example, there
are degrees of manslaughter and murder,
and the culpability increases as the intent
and wilfulness are more pronounced.
As seen, we can, and often do, make
erroneous judgments. But this is in nowise
due to the objectivity of the external and
is actually discovered, when discovered as
false, by our reason which dictates that an
object in existence does not exist other-
wise than it does exist. Look at a glass jar
filled with a mixture of very small balls,
some white and some black, and the whole
mixture appears to be gray, but each ball
when scrutinized alone will be either black
or white. I look at my desk and it seems
very solid indeed, but now I am told there
is space separating the component parts
of the myriad atoms that make up the desk.
The moon looks like a flat disc but I be-
lieve it is a sphere. The painted canvas is
really flat but the artist by foreshortening,
perspective and shadow creates the illusion
of three dimensions. The blind man does
not see color, but has a notion, though
very imperfectly, of it; color-blind persons
are confused in their sense of color, yet
have notions of it; and the man with per-
fect vision has the best idea of color and
even he can be deceived in his sense of
perception. To state that the deception is
known is to state that, by the intelligence,
conformity of judgment with the object as
it exists can be made. We might also here
remember that, along with other accidental
aspects, the color of a man's skin classifies
him as Caucasian, Negroid, Mongolian,
Indian or Malayan but doctors of derma-
tology tell us the same brown pigmentation
is common to all of us.
While the objectivity of truth makes it
attainable through reason, it nevertheless
remains that most of our knowledge is taken
on faith.
In our arriving at knowledge we should,
therefore, scrutinize the source from whence
it comes. A physician is a better authority
on disease than a baker even though the
baker may actually be in contact with more
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germs in a fly-ridden bakery; an astronomer
can tell more facts about the moon than an
artist who paints lunar scenes; and a theo-
logian can tell more about God than a scien-
tist will find in a test tube. Shakespeare's
Caesar said "I am as constant as the north-
ern star, of whose true fixed and lasting
quality, there is no fellow in the firma-
ment," but alas, the twin suns which we
call Polaris were not the north star of that
day and date. This I know on the author-
ity of astronomers and must therefore dis-
card the assertion of the great bard.
Yet faith we must have. Faith in man
and faith in God. Left to ourselves, how-
ever, our faith may be misplaced, as equally
left to ourselves without faith, we could
know and accomplish but little. There must
be some norm by which man can guide his
destiny. Can it be that, if most men should
come to agree with Hitler's persecution of
minority peoples, genecide would be con-
sidered lawful, or that if they should agree
with Lenin, Stalin and Khruschev, that
democracy means the will of the party
members, who are but a small minority of
the entire people ruled by them, that those
standards have evolved on which law is to
be based? Something in us shudders with
our emphatic denial of this. For it is
against our nature to accept such a propo-
sition and we may rightly call the conduct
of these tyrants unnatural. This is because
as men we are not instinctively cruel but
our faculty of the intellect desires truth and
our free will seeks good. There is a norm
for our thinking and conduct. This we call
the natural law, the law of our nature as
men based on right reason, and, as long
as there are men with the attributes con-
tained in the definition of man, they must
act and think according to this nature.
